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Speech of Se~ator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) 
For 'Release Monday A.M.'s, May 26, 1958 
TOWARDS A DURABLE PEACE 
IV. Strengthening the Truce in the Far East 
-r.t.r. President: 
I shall complete, today, a series of four addresses to the Senate 
'vhi.ch I began on May 15. These remarks are directed to the broad question 
o~ reducing the pressures for conflict which, at several points in the world, 
push mankind perilously close to the disaster of war. I intend these remarks 
ts an exploration of ways which may provide greater security for this nation 
Uld for freedom in a world that is more secure for all nations. In short, 
~hey are a search for a road to a more durable peace. 
In previous speeches, I have dealt with two pressure-points of 
langer, in Europe and the Middle East. I have examined the realities in 
ttese regions, as I see them and, looking to an American initiative for peace, 
I have advanced ideas which, I believe, fit these realities. 
In my remarks, today, I turn to a third pressure-point of danger, 
to the Far East. In the past, this region was a source of almost as much 
domestic political conflict as it still is of international conflict. But 
the years pass, Mr. President. It ~ll do no good now to return to the is-
sues, the statements, and the charges of the past decade. Our responsibility 
is to consider situations as they are today and as they possibly may be tomor-
row. 
A principal factor in consigning the recriminations of the past to 
history may well be that this Administration, like its predecessor, has dis-
covered that there are limits to what this country can do, short of war, to 
influence a situation in a region as vast and complex as the Far East. It 
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~ay also have learned that there are times when it is in the best interes t s 
of the United States to do less rather than more. This may explain, perhaps, 
wh;y the earlier, dimly remembered, policy of "waiting for the dust to settle" 
has been revived. Wrapped in an almost rigid official silence, it is this 
:rnJ.icy on the Far East which is being pursued by the Administration today. 
Mr. President, I raise this matter, not to open old wounds, and 
I certainly do not raise it because I am an enemy of silence. I raise it 
only because if we are to move towards a more durable peace in the Far East 
we must examine beneath the silence. We must determine whether it is the 
circumstances in that region from which the silence is derived or whether 
i"i.; is because of policies laid down by us. 
If the Far East were stable and peaceful that would explain this 
sil ence. If the interests of the United States in that region were secure 
and. flourishing under this policy of "waiting for the dust to settle" then, 
nothing particular would be gained by stirring the dust. 
But if the silence is fabricated from the events of the past, if 
it is fabricated from the fear of political repercussion and reprisal, then 
t!1at is another matter. We must overcome this fear, if the nation's polici!S 
are in a box in the Far East and we do not know how to get out. If that is 
the case, it is time to break this strange and sterile silence. It is time 
to pry open the lid by putting to work the most powerful tool of freedom--
the lever of free discussion. 
As I noted, Mr. President, the silence is understandable if there 
is stability and peace in the Far East and our interests in that region are 
well served by present policies. Can anyone contend, in all honesty, that 
such is actually the case? 
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Leaving aside the obvious violence which prevails in Indonesia, 
uhere is the stability in the Far East? Where is the peace? I have said 
it before and I say it again: What exists in the Far East is no peace at 
al~; it is a truce, a tenuous truce. It is patched together largely by un-
enforceable cease-fire agreements with the Communists in Korea and Viet Nom, 
and by a tacit cease-fire in the Formosa Straits. 
~s truce is kept from falling apart by aid to other nations 
which runs at the rate of well over a billion dollars a year--funds of the 
people of the United States--and by billions more of their funds in direct 
military expenditures, to keep tens of thousands of Americans in an instant 
s t ate of military readiness along the coast of Asia, from the 38th parallel 
in Korea to the southernmost tip of the continent. 
To be sure, it is better to spend money than lives. To be sure, 
it is better to have men ready to fight than fighting. But is it better, 
Mr. President, is it better to pretend that this desperate paste-and-patch 
t.~ce is peace, rather than to work for peace? Is it better, Mr. President, 
to suggest that this situation which puts a premium on official optimism and 
p·1blic ignorance of developments in the Far East while it absorbs billions 
of dollars of public funds, year after year, to hold together a quivering 
truce, serves the interest of the people of the United States.? 
The truth is, Mr. President, this truce, this tenuous truce can 
~ollapse at any time, no matter what we spend, no matter what we do to pre-
aerve it. No one can predict how it will collapse. What we can predict is 
t 1at we shall either move from this unstable holding action towards a durable 
~ace or, in a week, a month, a year or a decade, this situation will almost 
c: rtainly burst in our faces. 
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At this time, Mr. President, there are three principal fuses set 
and burning in the Far East. There is one in Korea; another in Viet Nam; 
and a third in the Formosan area. These potential explosions are fueled 
from several sources. Certainly, they are supplied in part by the ideologi-
cal struggle between Communist totalitarianism and freedom. Certainly they 
are supplied by great-power fears and interests which converge at these points--
the interests of the Soviet Union, the United States and China and, to an in-
creasing extent, the interests of an emergent Japan. 
Apart from these interests, however, there is another source of 
potential military conflict, perhaps the most dangerous in the Far East. 
That source, Mr. President, lies in the pressures arising from basic and 
still unsolved problems within the three areas. In Korea and Viet Nam, it 
is the problem of unification and the achievement of full and self-supporting 
national independence. In Formosa, it is the pressure of the unfinished busi-
ness of the Chinese Civil War and the pressure of the unsettled legal status 
of Formosa. 
The urge to unification and full independence in Viet Nam and, 
perhaps, even more, in Korea, is persistent and impatient. It has existed 
among the peoples of these countries for a long time. This urge vill con-
tinue to feed the pressure for war until there is some promise of progress 
towards its fulfillment. Unless this beginning is made there will be no 
reasonable assurance of a durable peace in either Korea or VietNam. 
Similarily, Mr. President, neither side in the Chinese Civil War 
has really accepted, as a final settlement, the unwritten cease-fire in the 
Fonnosan Straits. This cease-fire leaves 600 million people on the mainland 
under the control of Peking communism and 10 million on the island of Formosa 
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under the control of the Chinese National Government. Complicating this 
question, moreover, is the dangling legal status of Formosa. Is Formosa 
a ~rovince of China, as both Chinese groups claim, or is it something else7 
Until some way is found to deal peacefully with these questions there will 
be no reasonable assurance of a durable peace in the Far East, regardless 
of what we spend to preserve the truce, regardless of the state of our own 
nilitary alertness in that region. 
Each of these situations, Korea, Viet Nam and Formosa contains a 
danger of war, which is not now adequately controlled. That danger is the 
6anger of an unpredictable, compulsive act, a mad resort to military action 
t?r unity in Korea and VietNam, and for a final settlement of the Formosan 
_ssue. Should local military action break out at any of these points, it is 
al~ost inevitable that the great powers--enmeshed as they are, in the tensions 
of conflicting national interests and ideological fears--it is almost inevi-
table that they will be drawn into the maelstrom. 
We may well ask ourselves: who will gain if war is unleashed in 
the Far East? Certainly not the people of Korea or Viet Nam. They have 
already seen the fruits of a pursuit of the goal of unification and full in-
dependence by war. They have seen it in mangled cities and villages and in 
millions killed, injured and made homeless. They have seen it in the freez-
ing death of war in the Korean mountains and in the rotting death of war in 
the jungles and rice fields of Indo-China. 
Certainly, this country will not gain nor will the Chinese people. 
We suffered tens of thousands of casualities in Korea; the Chinese many times 
more. Will the Russians gain7 Yes, they might if they could stay clear of 
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it. But because they escaped the bloody consequences of a Korean conflict 
once does not mean that they will escape unscathed again. 
Will freedom gain from a war of unification in Korea or Viet Nam? 
Indeed, will totalitarianism? These words will echo with a hollow, meaning-
less sound, if they echo through the silent smoldering vestiges of a world 
in ruins. 
The fact is that neither national nor ideological gain can be ex-
pected by anyone from a renewal of conflict in the Far East. The fact is 
that a military solution of the present problems of the Far East is no solu-
tion at all. Because it is not, however, does not preclude it from being 
attempted. On the contrary, unless we begin to face the question of unifica-
tion of Korea and Viet Nam by peaceful means, unless a beginning is made in 
dealing with the Formosan question, a conflict is, as I have noted, very 
likely to come--not only to Koreans, Vietnamese and Chinese, but to Americans, 
Russians and Japanese as well. 
What we must ask ourselves, Mr. President, is whether there is some 
way in which this conflict can be prevented? Is there some way in which we 
can move away from the edge of the abyss towards greater stability in the Far 
East? Is there room for an American initiative for a more durable peace in 
the Far East? 
In seeking answers to these questions, let me deal first with the 
divided countries of Korea and Viet ~am. While the problem has unique 
characteristics in each country, in substance , it is the same in both. 
Korea and Viet Nam have both emerged from a dependent colonial status since 
World War II. Both have moved part of the way towards a unified, self-support-
ing national existence. They are, as the Senate knows, however, still divided 
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cou~tries, with the northern halves held by communist-oriented peoples and the 
southern halves governed by non-communist nationalists, closely associated with 
this nation. Each segment is still dependent on outside assistance for its sur-
vival. 
The differences run deep between the communist and free sections of 
Korea and VietNam. In one respect, however, there is a similarity in the 
words which emanate from north of the 38th parallel in Korea and south of it 
and from north and south of the 17th parallel in Viet Nam. Koreans and Vie1-
namese, communists and nationalists alike, preach unification. Both preach 
full independence. The same theme echoes, too, from Moscow, Washington and 
even Peking. 
I am aware, Mr. President, that the communists do not necessarily 
mean the same thing as we do when they use the same words. It does not fol-
low, however, that the Korean people whether they are under communist or 
nationalist control do not speak the same language. Nor does it mean that 
the Vietnamese people, regardless of who controls them, do not speak the same 
language. Koreans and Vietnamese both have a very good idea of what unity 
means and what full independence means. They want both, and any policy which 
seeks to build peace cannot ignore the fact that they want both. 
There have been attempts in the past to achieve peaceful unification 
in Korea and Viet Nam and they have failed. It does not follow, however, that 
we have exhausted the possibilities of peaceful solution. To contend that it 
is impossible to bring about unification by peaceful means is to argue the 
inevitability of a war of unification, a war which as I have noted, in present 
circumstances, will probably engulf the world and will benefit no nation, least 
of all Korea and Viet Nam. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 39, Folder 61, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 8 -
That other alternative exists to peaceful unification or a war of 
unification? The perpetuation of the present division of these two countries? 
The experience of history suggests that, even if desirable, this course is 
not likely to be possible. Even if it were possible it would, at best, mean 
only partial independence for the peoples of these divided countries. The 
different zones would continue to be, as they are now, dependent for assistance 
on other countries. 
For the United States, that situation would involve an interminable 
subsidy of the free zones in Korea and Viet Nam or, if we grew tired of that 
burden, a willingness ta permit these regions to turn elsewhere for aid. We 
reay well ask, to whom? To Japan? To Soviet Russia? To China? 
There is only one path, Mr. President, in these circumstances which 
seems to me to make sense in terms of the interest of the people of Korea and 
Viet Nam and in terms of the interests of the people of the United States. 
Let us do our best to hold the tenuous truce which we are now holding but let 
us at the same time pursue incessantly by peaceful means, the unity and full 
independence of Korea and Viet Nam. I hope that this Administration is not 
so discouraged by past failures to bring about this development that it is 
prepared to throw up its bands in futility. I hope that it is not resigned 
to taking the easy out of holding the present truce in perpetuity while the 
propaganda war and the aid-programs go on. That is no out at all. It is a 
costly exercise in sound and fury which produces little if any constructive 
results. 
If there is a way out in Korea and Viet Nam, the first essential 
ie to free ourselves from the entrapment of the misused and overused words 
of the propaganda war. I need hardly add that others need to do the same. 
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The situation in Korea and Viet Nam has been blamed by us on the communists. 
They have, in turn, attributed it to us. And each side within each country 
brands the other with the failure to achieve unity and full independence. 
The words have flown so thick and fast, in the past, Mr. President, 
that they may have blotted out the one possible road to peace in Korea and 
Viet Nam. It seems to me that, in the eagerness for verbal recrimination, 
one source of the problem of division in these two countries goes virtually 
unmentioned. Nevertheless, it may be more significant than the conspiracies 
of the Russians, the aggressive arrogance of a Communist China or the inertia 
of our own policies. 
I refer, Mr. President, to the fears and rivalries of the Koreat 
and Vietnamese political leaders and parties on both sides of the dividing 
lines. These are not new fears and rivalries; their ancestry is traceable 
to the circumstances of the earliest unsuccessful uprisings, decades ago, 
against Japan in Korea and France in Viet Nam. There is not the time to go 
into that history now but those who were involved in it, those who are st~ll 
active in the political life of Korea and VietNam, both Communists and 
Nationalists, will remember it well. Sufficient to say that in the yeare 
since the end of World War I, these fears have grown deeper, the rivalri~s 
more bitter, at least among the older leaders. 
The North Korean communists may shout that only the presence of 
United Nations forces in the south stands in the way of peaceful unification, 
as they boast, at the same time, of the present Chinese communist withdrawal 
beyond the Yalu; but they know better. The South Korean nationalists may 
point out that they are for free elections to unify the country, and that 
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all that stands in the way of peaceful unification is the refusal of the 
northern communists to accept this impartial device; but they know better. 
A similar situation may prevail in reverse in Viet Nam; and the leaders 
there, too, know better. They know that these and similar contentions, how-
ever effective in the war of words, will not bring unity and full independence, 
in peace, any closer at this time. 
The truth, I believe, Mr. President, is that the political leader-
ship on both sides in these divided countries is unprepared in present circum-
stances to accept any peaceful solution or even a means of peaceful solution 
which would endanger their dominant position, at least in the region in which 
it now prevails. And I may add, in present circumstances, who can blame them? 
For what is involved in Korea and Viet Nam is not a gentle game of 
politics in which the losers come back to win another day. What is involved 
is a life and death political struggle among those who wield or aspire to 
a. 
power. It is/struggle fought not only, or principally, with ballots but with 
bullets and the threat of bullets. The losers do not come back to try again. 
They are made to disappear via the concentration camps, the assassin or the 
firing squad. 
In all realism, we must ask: can an active nationalist walk the 
streets unmolested in any city in communist North Korea or communist North 
Viet Nam at this time? Equally, in all honesty, we must ask: can an active 
communist walk the streets in safety in any city in South Korea or South 
Viet Nam at this time? The answer, of course, is that they cannot. Yet 
these are the principal political groupings which must live together in a 
peaceful, unified Korea and Viet Nam. 
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Similarly, there are opposing military forces in the north and 
south zones of the two countries, hundreds of th~lsands of men responsive 
to different political commands, to communist and nationalist commands. 
These are men trained to use weapons and to kill their racial kin of dif-
ferent ideological outlook across the borders. How are these armies to be 
unified? Is this a problem which can be solved peacefully in Korea by 
withdrawal of the Chinese forces or the United Nations command at this time? 
Indeed, is it a problem that can be solved peacefully by free elections at 
this time? To be sure, withdrawal of all foreign troops is a desirable 
goal in a unified fully independent and secure Korea and Viet Nam. But what 
will withdrawing foreign troops contribute at the present time to achieving 
this state of affairs? To be sure, a free election is a necessary device of 
responsible government but it cannot work miracles. What immediate relevance 
does it have when losers of free elections face death or other types of con-
signment to oblivion? 
I believe, Mr. President, that if we examine the problems of uni-
fication of Korea and Viet Nam with an ounce of objectivity, we are compelled 
to the conclusion that neither the communist sides nor the nationalist sides 
in these divided countries have yet put forward a proposal which will permit 
the divisions to be closed in peace. We are compelled to the conclusion 
that no proposal which assumes that the groundwork for unification already 
exists has validity in present circumstances. 
Yet, Mr. President, asi .noted earlier in my remarks, the tenuous 
truce in VietNam and Korea may well give way to direct military action un-
less progress towards peaceful unity soon begins. I do not know whether a 
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start in that direction can be made at all. It seems to me, however, that 
if there is any prospect for one, it lies in the gradual breakdown of the 
rigid social, economic, and political separations which divide what is one 
people into two, along the 38th and 17th parallels in Korea and Viet Nam, 
respectively. This gradual breakdown, moreover, must come before rather 
than after actual unification takes place. 
Both sides have long professed their desire for peaceful unifica-
tion. Perhaps, the time is approaching to put these professions to a test. 
Perhaps the time has come for the United States, as an initiative for peace, 
to advocate a gradual restoration, first, of social intercourse between the 
zones of the divided countries. If intentions are, in truth, peaceful, those 
who control the zones will permit families and friends long separated to be 
reunited. If there is fear of espionage and subversion, then let the ex-
change across the parallels take place at first under the close supervision 
Jf the powers that be in each zone. The important point, however, is that 
;hey begin. 
It seems to me, too, that the time is ripe for this country to 
Ldvocate to all Koreans and to all Vietnamese the gradual restoration of 
economic relations between the zones. As it is now, the unnatural divisions 
make it virtually impossible for either part of either country to become 
ad-equately self -supporting. 
I believe that these basic steps towards unity must be undertaken 
bT Koreans and by Vietnamese, not by Chinese, Russians or Americans, on their 
bEhalf. It is the Koreans and the Vietnamese who will have to learn to live 
ani to work together once again, not outsiders. If they can reestablish a 
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groundwork of social and economic intercourse amongst themselves, perhaps, 
in time, they shall work out a common political structure for the whole of 
their respective countries. If they cannot find common ground in these 
simpler matters, however, it is pointless to contend that peaceful unifica-
tion can occur in a single stroke, whether it be by the device of foreign 
troop withdrawal or, in truth, by the instrumentality of free elections at 
this time. 
While the primary impetus for progress towards unification along 
the lines I have suggested obviously must come from the Koreans and Vietnamese 
themselves, nevertheless, there is a role for the great powers whose interests 
and fears converge on Korea and Viet Nam. If peace is sought in good faith, 
then these two small nations will cease to be made pawns in the word war of 
the great powers. On the contrary, they will be given every encouragement 
by both sides to work out the complex problems of unification gradually and 
in peace. If and when these problems do begin to yield to solution, it will 
be time to consider troop withdrawal, free elections, and guaranties of the 
security of these countries. 
Mr. President, I know that the course I have been suggesting here 
offers no spectacular remedy for the problem of the division of Korea and 
Viet Nam. It is, at best, a slow and difficult course and promises no 
certain success. Yet, I must ask, what is the alternative? For the United 
States, the alternative as I see it is to continue indefinitely as we are, 
to go on pouring millions upon millions of dollars a year into Viet Nam and 
Korea merely to hold a situation of neither war nor peace, a situation which 
is very likely in any event to give way sooner or later to war. For the 
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Russians and the Chinese the prospect is not much different even though for 
them, I am sure, it is probably less costly. 
If there are sound reasons for not taking an initiative for peace 
along the lines I have suggested--and there may well be--by all means let 
us not take it. By the same token, however, let us lift the curtain of 
silence on Far Eastern policy long enough to let the American people and 
the world hear those reasons. Let us not delude ourselves with the belief 
that what we now have is peace in Korea and Viet Nam. And let us not delude 
ourselves with the belief that we are going to get peaceful unification and 
full independence in these countries by the policies we are now pursuing. 
I turn now, Mr. President, to the problem of the Formosan situa-
tion, the third major threat to peace in the Far East. It is, perhaps, the 
most complex of all the problems of building a more durable peace which con-
fronts this nation at the present time. I am frank to admit, Mr. President, 
that I see little hope of its solution. Yet, the problem must be explored 
if we mean to have peace. 
I believe the difficulty stems in part from the fact that oddly 
enough, the Chinese communists and the Chinese nationalists are in agree-
ment on one point. Both regard Formosa as an integral part of China. As 
such it becomes inseparable from the unfinished business of the Chinese 
Civil War. For the communists, it is the one remaining area of China--
outside of Hongkong and Macao--over which they have not yet extended their 
sway. For the nationalists, it is the one free province remaining in China; 
it is a base from which they hope eventually to liberate the mainland and 
the almost 600 million people now under communist control. 
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I cannot see , Mr. President, how this nation can accept the 
doctrine that Formosa is a province of China at this time. It is true, 
that the great majority of Formosans are racially derived from China. It 
is true that the return of Formosa to China was foreseen in the Cairo 
Declaration of 1943. These and similar facts tend to support the claims 
of the Chinese communists and the nationalists. 
It is also true, however, that for fifty years the Formosan 
Chinese were cut off from the mainland and developed a different type of 
Chjnese culture, heavily influenced by Japan and by indigenous factors. 
It is also true that the Cairo Declaration presumed the existence of a 
unified and peaceful China to which Formosa would be returned and that 
Cbina has not materialized. It is also true that the Japanese Peace Treat,{ 
diQnot provide for the return of Formosa to China although it did provide 
for the relinquishment of Japanese sovereignty over the Island. 
Mr. President, I am not a lawyer. I do not question the Chines6 
view--communist and nationalist--of Formosa as a province of China on the 
basis of law although there is no reason to assume that it cannot be so 
questioned. I question it first, on the ground of elementary justice to 
the people of Formosa. They had nothing to do with the Chinese Civil War 
and I can see no justification in subjecting them to the bloodbath which 
may still ensue as a result of that conflict. 
I question the Chinese view, too, on the grounds of the security 
rights of the United States with respect to Formosa. An aggression was 
staged against this nation, in part, from that Island, and I believe even 
the communists are not so blinded by their propaganda as to deny that t~e 
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sacrifices of Americans in World War II had something to do--to say the 
least--with the defeat of that aggression. If the Russians have a right 
to secure their border against a repetition of the invasion which they 
suffered in World War II, I presume we have a similar right to forestall 
a repetition of the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
I think we have made it clear, but if necessary, let us make it 
clearer: we seek no territorial aggrandizement in Formosa. What we do 
seek, what we have every right to seek, is reasonable assurance that it 
shall not again become a base of hostile action against us. We do not have 
that assurance if we accept the Chinese premise that Formosa is already a 
part of China. 
I do not accept, the Chinese premise, finally, Mr. President, 
because to concede that Formosa is a part of China is to concede that it 
may legitimately be fought over by Chinese communists and nationalists in 
pursuit of the unfinished Civil War. In present circumstances to permit 
the extension of that war to the Island would obviously constitute the 
gravest possible danger to world peace. 
I know that we cannot impose acceptance of the principle of 
neutralization of Formosa on either the Chinese Communists or the Chinese 
Nationalists. We can only hope that in their own interests and in the 
interests of the world they will see its validity. Certainly the degree 
with which they do see it and act accordingly should affect our own policies 
on the numerous other issues which arise in connection with our relations to 
China. 
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Mr. President, I have not included in my remarks today any comment 
on developments in Japan and the serious difficulties in Indonesia. I have 
not overlooked these matters and, in omitting them, I do not mean to suggest 
that they lack relevance. If we are to move away from the abyss, however, 
it seems to me essential that we look first at the points of most imminent 
danger and concentrate our efforts on reducing this danger. It is at these 
points, Viet Nam, Korea and Formosa, that we shall either begin to build a 
durable peace or face, sooner or later, the virtual certainity of war in the 
Far East. 
Mr. President, in the series of four statements which I have just 
concluded I have been trying to answer a question which has been on the minds 
of many people in this country and throughout the world for a long time. 
The question, Mr. President, is simply whether or not there is some way to 
get out of the drift towards war, some road towards a greater stability in 
the world, some room for a sensible American initiative for peace. 
In these statements, I have tried to isolate the principal points 
of danger in the international scene, as I see them, in Europe, the Middle 
East, and the Far East. I have sought to analyse the sources of danger to 
peace at these points. I have examined the policies which we are pursuing 
in dealing with them. Throughout these addresses, I have suggested ideas 
which might point the way to an American initiative for peace, not to a peace 
at any price, but to a rational peace with which decent people in this country, 
infue Soviet Union, in all countries can live. 
Whether anything will come of these ideas, I do not know. The 
recent incidents in Latin America, the grave developments in France and in 
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Lebanon demand the immediate attention of those who are charged with responsi-
bility for conducting the nation's foreign policy. That is nothing new. It 
has been the pattern of our conduct of foreign policy for several years. As 
it is now, our policies, for the most part, do not shape eventsj they are 
shaped by events. We are forever in pursuit of the last step on the last 
car of a train that is always pulling away from us. We move from crisis to 
crisis in international relations. We cling to old policies, to old ways, 
in a kind of fearful or unconcerned or optimistic inertia until these policies 
are wrenched from their moorings by an international storm, in Latin America 
or the Middle East or somewhere else. Then there is a wild scuttling about, 
\·ri th vast wastes of energy and resources, in a desperate effort to locate 
new moorings. 
One of the reasons for these remarks was the hope that \ole might 
begin, as we must at some point, to get on top of developments instead 
of trailing them. I hope occasionally that we may be able to anticipate 
them in time to deal with them constructively. 
I do not know, Mr. President, whether or not we shall find, in any 
circumstances, the durable peace which this country requires, which the world 
requires. Peace depends on many nations, on many factors. I doubt, however, 
that we shall find it, even in the best of circumstances, if we go on as we 
are, from crisis to crisis with crisis-remedies and stop-gap action. 
I believe there is a chance for a durable peace. I believe it lies 
in a continuous and perceptive appraisal of the unfolding realities of inter-
national life and a determination to deal with these realities with initiative 
with honesty, with courage, with soberness and with adaptability. This re-
sponsibility applies equally to the Administration, the Congress, and the 
American people. 
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We must not lose the chance to move towards a more durable peace. 
We must not lose it1 Mr. President, not only because peace is the deepest 
desire of the people of the United States and the world; we must not lose 
it because peace is the most urgent need of mankind. 
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